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PLURALISM IN SOCIAL ECONOMICS·
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The Review of Social Economy was first published in 1942 as
the annual Papers and Proceedings journal of the Catholic Economic Association founded in December 1941, with a charter membership of 140 drawn largely from Catholic colleges and universities in the United States. By the end of the decade the journal had
become submissions-based, had added book reviews, and was
published twice annually. Early papers focused on the application
of Catholic social doctrine to economics, the role of social values
in the economy and in economics, social justice, and contemporary problems in social-institutional economic organization (such
as labor relations and unions, employment, social security, credit
policy and the Federal Reserve, and postwar reconstruction).
Though initially the majority of journal's contributors were neoclassical economists, solidarism, a theoretical orientation critical of
neoclassical economics with origins in the work of Heinrich Pesch
(1854-1926) and Goetz Briefs (1889-1974) in interwar Germany,
came to represent the thinking of an increasing number of social
economists after its revival by past editor William R. Waters. Both
Pesch and Briefs rejected liberalism and laissez faire, and argued
instead for the idea of a social market economy and the view that
the. economic process is embedded in the larger living context of
socIety.
In 1970, the members of the Association elected to give up
their strict identification with Catholic social thinking, and renamed the organization the Association for Social Economics to
reflect and strengthen the increasingly pluralistic character of its
membership, and to encourage development of a broader range of
"" The author is indebted to Mark Lutz, Edward O 'Boyle. and William Waters for comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
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philosophical and intellectual resources devoted to explanation of
th~ economy as a socIal economy and economics as social economICS. I~ the years thereafter the organization expanded to include
InstltutIO~al~sts: Marxists: and huma?ists, who were receptive to
the AssocIatIOn s emphasIs upon socIal values in economics, and
who brought new arguments regarding the socially-embedded
and val~,:,-Iaden character of the economy and economics to bear
on tr~dmonal economic theory, alternative theory, public policy,
the hISt?ry. of economics, an.d ~he method?logy of the subject l .
The ~bJ~ctlves of the ASSOCIatiOn for Social Economics, as set
forth m Its new Constitution, are as follows:
.
1.. To foster research a~d p~blication centered On the reciprocal relatJ~)fl~hlP be~een economIC sCience and broader questions of human

dignIty, ethIcal values, and social philosophy, [and to] encourage the
efforts of all schobrs who are dedIcated to exploring the ethical presupposItIons and Imphcanons of economic science.
2. To conside~ t~e personal and social dimensions of economic
p~oblems and to aSSIst ~n the formulation of economic policies consistent

WIth a concern for e~hI~al values. and pluralistic community and the demands of personal dIgnity (Revtew of Social Economy, 1970, p. 244).
.~he Associ.ati.on for Social Economics is thus, by charter, an
explICItly pl.urahstlc organization with a unity defined to accomodate very dIfferent. ~Yfe~ of approaches to economics, yet also so
as to exclude POSitiVistIC approaches to economics. The nearl
q~arter century of publication in the Review since 1970 charts tJ!e
hlst~ry of this plu~alistic enterprise dedicated to explaining the
relat~on of economics. to SOCIal values, and, as it has turned out,
contmu~ly at odds With orthodox social science and neoclassical
~conomlcs. Her.. I sketch a br!ef acco~nt of this history by focusmg upon the. dIlemmas assocIated WIth explaining the economy
and eC?nOmICS . as fun~~n.'e?t~lIy social and permeated with
n~rm~tlve v:llue m a posmvlStlC Intellectual environment in which
SClentlSm reIgns.
. I~ to.day's world dominated by liberal philosophy and indivlduahst Ideology, social economists encounter a deeply rooted
1: ~n excellen~ source fo~ understanding the early development of the
ASSOClatlon for SOCIal EconomICS are the readings in Lutz (1990).

and unexamined conviction on the part of academics, students,
and people generally that moral values have little significance in
modem society. Neoclassical economics bears much responsibility for fostering this belief, since it denies its world view is valueladen, narrows normative economics to innocuous Pareto efficiency, and diminishes consideration of justice, need, and human
dignity in economic life. Indeed, it can be argued that this 'marginalization of ethics' flows directly from neoclassicism's characterization of individuals as mere collections of subjective
preferences2 • Yet if the view of individuals held by most economists must be radically reconceptualized before social economists
can elaborate persuasive, alternative views of normative value in
the economic process, then the obstacle to progress is truly significant, since there is surely even less willingness among neoclassical economists to re-examine their theory of the individual than
there is to question their treatment of normative value. Of course
not all social economists see the matter in just quite this way,
though most generally do agree that economics needs to be fundamentally transformed away from the liberal neoclassical world
view that treats individuals atomistically. The task facing social
economics, then, is a large and difficult one, and this consequently
sets the terms for the key challenge facing social economists:
where to start and how much to attempt arguing. Two schools of
thinking and two strategies in this regard distinguish social economists on this question.
One school of social economists believes it is strategically important to demonstrate that the normative analysis of neoclassical
economics regarding improvements in individual and social wellbeing fails in important ways. For example, when neoclassical
economists argue that divorce tends to be Pareto efficient, it may
be replied that this depends upon ignoring the associated welfare
losses for children in poverty. Or, when neoclassical economists
emphasize the importance of consumer sovereignty and the satis2. I have argued that neoclassicism is responsible for the 'marginalization of

ethics' in Davis (1987). and that the neoclassical theory of ethics is the logical
positivist-emotivist view that ethical statements are mere expressions of feeling in

Davis (1994).
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faction of preferences, it may be replied that this depends upon
ignoring situations in which the market creates preferences harmful to individuals. For social economists who argue along these
lines, neoclassical normative economics is seriously deficient in its
ethical vision and as a public policy guide. Showing that this is so
demonstrates not only that atomistic markets do not have the welfare features claimed for them, but also that neoclassical analysis
fails to capture the real experience of individuals. Most of the
empirical research and a good share of the conceptual research
published in the Review has this character. In the last several
years, papers published on women and families, discrimination
and labor market segmentation, growth and stagnation, internal
conflicts within firms, and a variety of other topics have sought to
show that neoclassical economic research misunderstands the
normative implications of the functioning of the market economy.
The assumption that thus lies behind this strategy is that persuasive critique of the social-ethical side of neoclassical economics
will ultimately have the greatest impact on the future development
of economics. Essentially, social economists of this orientation
believe that a theory inattentive to society's full range of ethical
commitments regarding fairness, basic need, and human rights
cannot be successful in the long run. Their conviction that showing this is of pre-eminent importance typically derives from a
strong sense of personal moral responsibility regarding why one
carries out research.
A second group of social economists believes that the neoclassicism's world view is so evidently defective that its chief propositions can be readily exhibited as false, and then replaced by
reasonable, alternative ideas which would be foundational to a
new economics persuasive and plausible to openminded individuals. Social economists of this orientation generally already
possess strong heterodox theoretical commitments, including Institutionalism, Marxism and radicalism, solidarism, cooperativism
and communitarianism, Post-Keynesianism, humanism and Kantianis",:, feminism, environmentalism, and behavioralism. Though
they dIsagree among themselves over the nature of alternative
theory, they tend to share the view that economics and social science always presuppose a value-laden world view, and that the
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neoclassical world view is in important respects not socially progressive, both because of the values it promotes and because of its
positivistic self-image. They thus generally contest individualism
and explanation solely in terms of self-interest motivation, the
supposed commensurability of tastes, the instrumental character
of rationality as opposed to a rationality of ends, work as necessarily undesirable, and the idea of the person as purely a subjective
being without a need for dignity and self-esteem. Essentially, the
strategy this type of social economic research employs is to
attempt to provide a better theory. The assumption that lies behind the strategy is that solid critique followed by good alternative analysis is ultimately persuasive, if not to those already committed to neoclassicism, then to those who are in the process of
forming their future theoretical attachments. And, the conviction
that this strategy is worth pursuing derives from a confidence in
alternative theoretical approaches, which are themselves rooted in
carefully considered views about the nature of economic life and
society.
Each of these twO strategies thus has its respective rationale,
but each, it should be added, has also been argued to have important limitations. Against those intent upon demonstrating that
neoclassical economic theory generates the wrong results about
individual and social well-being, it is often argued that, without a
fully developed alternative conception of the economic process,
one can never convincingly explain how a broader normative vision of economics is possible. And against those who believe that
creating socially progressive alternative economic analysis is the
primary responsibility of social economists, it is often argued that
better theory must begin by premising our salient moral intuitions. Of course, juxtaposing these two points in just this manner
suggests that, rather than two strategies each with their own
limitations, the situation is better described as one in which the
two strategies complement one another with each focusing on a
different part of an overall project. There is some truth to this
view, and indeed it explains much of the unity of the Association
for Social Economics. Yet at the same time it would be a mistake
to minimize the range of disagreement between members of the
Association and those who publish in the Review of Social Eco-
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nomy over the relative importance of different moral values and
the relative importance of different alternative theoretical
approaches. It is a disagreement, as noted above, over just where
to start and how much to attempt arguing vis-a-vis an economics
profession strongly attached to an unreflective scientism. It is a
disagreement, perhaps more importantly, that constitutes the
source of pluralism in the Association, and as such is a disagreement that may either strengthen or weaken the organization. This
naturally invites us to ask as we look toward the future about the
prospects for the sort of pluralistic enterprise in which the Association and the Review are engaged. Is pluralism in social economic thinking likely to strengrhen or weaken the Association and
the Review? Indeed, what generally is the impact of pluralism on
organizations that necessarily change through time?
All organizations of course undergo change in time as its
members change - a process that is helpfully understood in terms
of generational turnover. The Association for Social Economics
seems to be somewhere between its third and fourth generations
in membership, one effect of which is that the early history and
purposes of the organization have become increasingly remote for
current members. Clearly the passage of time alters the conditions
under which we operate together with many of the issues we confront, and we must be realistic about how much of the spirit and
thinking of the past can or even ought to be preserved in the continuing work of any organization. But I want to suggest that the
issue of generational change facing the Association and other like
pluralistic organizations raises special problems over and above
the general one of organizational continuity and memory. Pluralism tends to have a positive connotation in contemporary discussion. It suggests tolerance, open-mindedness, and a cosmopolitan
view of ideas. But there is a darker side to pluralism associated
with division, fragmentation, and loss of shared direction, and a
more complete grasp of pluralism in organizations surely depends
upon understanding how balance is maintained berween openness
and coherence. Two problems in panicular have arisen for the
Association and Review in this respect.
The first problem concerns the recent historical development
of the Association and the timing of generational change. Genera-

tions, of course, are loosely and conventionally delimited, and it
may often be as appropriate to say that the overlappingness of
periods of activiry of individuals rules out speaking of generations
at all. But this has not been the case in the Association which
formed a cohesive generation of new members and contributors to
the Review at the time the Association was reconstituted in 1970.
While of course many individuals who had been involved in the
old Catholic Economic Association played an important part in
the transition, the fact that a new sort of intentionally pluralistic
organization was then established gave special prominence and
responsibiliry to a collection of younger individuals who were beginning their prime working lives. These individuals embraced the
challenge of creating a new type of organization, one whose unity
was to grow out of very different theoretical and intellectual
approaches. Their contributions to the Review in the years that
followed gave the organization and the journal a particular c1ariry
and cohesiveness. But most of these individuals have now moved
beyond the active part of their working lives, and perhaps ironically, because they played such a large role in the Association and
Review for so many years, a like space and opportunity - it seems
- was precluded for later, younger individuals, many of whom
surely were attracted to late 1970s and early 1980s radical political
economy, Marxism, and Post-Keynesianism for which new
forums and challenges were being established.
The second problem of pluralism for the Association - and
indeed almost all intellectual organizations that seek to establish
themselves more strongly as societies - concerns the general
change in the academic employment relations in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. In the past, the threat of unemployment for an
academic having once been hired seems hardly as great as it has
become today. Today performance levels are more closely monitored to determine merit for continuation in employment, where
the simple fact that measurable outcomes exist in publication has
meant that performance is generally evaluated according to
volume and rate of publication. One important effect of this has
been that, since teaching remains a requirement, the need to publish has raised work loads for academics, thus forcing them to
eliminate other activities previously engaged in. Of these, profes-

126

sional service both within the university and to crossuniversity
organizations has been substantially reduced. Within the university this has meant decline in interdisciplinary interaction, the exchange of ideas, and the collegiality of academia. Outside of the
university this has meant decline of involvement in the affairs of
professional organizations, and a tendency for such organizations
to become mere subscription services and conference participation
outlets. For the Association, as with other like professional organizations, this has meant less contact between members, less
shared activity, and less thought and commitment regarding the
difficult task of building and maintaining a pluralistic organization. In contrast, more orthodox professional organiza.tions seem
to have prospered in recent years, most likely because they originally operated as research promotion services for their members,
who thus have maintained their affiliations as just another job requirement.
For the Association of Social Economics, these two problems
have interacted in a challenging manner. Generational turnover
has in good part removed the leadership that previously defended
the strengths and promise of pluralism, while the increasing confinement of academics to their computers has created a pool of
potential members less able to engage the objectives and purposes
of the Association than in the past. Despite this, the Association
and the Review seems to have found a way to survive as a pluralistic organization, albeit one different in nature than in the past.
First, as indicated above, the Association and journal have come
to include an even larger collection of heterodox economists than
was involved in the 1970 combination of Catholic solidarists,
Marxists, Institutionalists, and humanists. In many cases new
orientations represent offshoots of past heterodox traditions. In
other instances new issues have defined new groups outside of the
mainstream. Second, the Association and the journal are becoming more international than was the case for the first four decades
of their history as principally North American institutions. In
some considerable degree, this has been a matter of the internationalization of academia in tenns of opportunities for interaction
across countries (personal and electronic) and the emergence at
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the end of the 1980s of both English as a universal language and a
worldwide publication market.
These two developments make for an interesting comment on
the transfonnation of pluralism in the Association for Social Economics and the Review of Social Economy. On the one hand, diversity has only increased, and this cannot but represent a challenge facing both the organization and the journal. On the other
hand, that the cause of unity out of diversity, the cause of pluralism, seems to have become increasingly a welcome one in recent
years gives good reason to think that the challenge of gre.ater diversity not only can be met, but perhaps represents for an mcreasing number an especially valuable project in itself. The May 1994
conference in Bergamo on pluralism in economics seems effective
testimony on this latter score. At the conference, many participants commented with some frustration that issues clearly dividing individuals were not easily joined and discussed. But the conference did occur, and different positions were aIred for common
consideration. I suggest that the conference functioned as a microcosm for the exchange of ideas between contrasting points of
view. In this it seems to have shared the experience of the Association and the Review that pluralism requires a conscious defense if
it is to succeed. Pluralism, in the Association for Social Economics
and more generally, then, needs active support to survive. This is a
lesson to be learned from both the conference and from the history of the Association for Social Economics.
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CLARK, CHARLES MICHAEL ANDRES, Economic Theory and Natural Philosophy. The Search for the Natural Laws of the Economy, Aldershot,
Edward Elgar, 1992, pp. X, 198.

The merit of Clark's book is that it proposes a unitary thesis in
explanation of why a large part of economic theory has turned away
from historical and social interpretation to assume the structure of a for-

malized science.
The book's essential argument is that in the development of economic theory, from Adam Smith to Arrow and Debreu, a "Natural Law
Outlook" (NLO) has been uncritically retained. That is to say, a preanalytical assumption has been preserved, according to which the regularities and unifortnities of the physical world have an equivalent in the
social and economic universe. The NLO, which was particularly widespread in the second half of the eighteenth century, was based on the
belief that the universe, in all its manifestations, was organized according

a "design" conceived by a benevolent God. This belief was strengthened by Adam Smith, in whose work the "Natural Law Outlook becomes part of preconceptions of economic theory" (p. 35). There were
three decisive influences on Smith's thought: Newtonianism, Natural
Theology, and the elaborations of the natural law philosophers.
From these currents of thought derived belief in a "natural order"
which could be described by laws which embraced both the physical and
the moral and social universe one, since each were expressions of the
same order. The "invisible hand)" as Macfie has pointed out, was the
product of this view (specific to Natural Theology), because God provided individuals with inclinations to promote his purposes and, ultimately, general welfare. In Smith, however, Clark discerns a dichotomy.
Although on the one hand the NLO gave rise to a static theory (which
culminated in his investigation of the regularities characterizing the
"Natural Order"), on the other one finds a dynamic vision of society in
to

which his enquiry stresses historical and institutional aspects. Hume,

and especially Montesquieu, were the inspirers of the theoretical
approach to "society as process".
Clark's intention, however, is to show that in the history of econo-

mic ideas natural philosophy increasingly became the model for moral
philosophy and, consequently, for economic thought. In Bentham first

